We relax the Kajii and Morris (1997a) notion of equilibrium robustness by allowing approximate equilibria in close incomplete information games. The new notion is termed "approximate robustness". The approximately robust equilibrium correspondence turns out to be upper hemicontinuous, unlike the (exactly) robust equilibrium correspondence. As a corollary of the upper hemicontinuity, it is shown that approximately robust equilibria exist in all two-player zero-sum games and all two-player two-strategy games, whereas (exactly) robust equilibria may fail to exist for some games in these categories. JEL Classi…cation Number : C72.
Introduction
Kajii and Morris (1997a) -henceforth KM -proposed a re…nement of Nash equilibrium, based on the idea that an equilibrium should not change much if the information in a game becomes incomplete to a certain degree. More An earlier version of this paper was entitled "On Continuity of Robust Equilibria". Kajii precisely, given a complete information game g, a game with incomplete information is considered to be "close"to g if the sets of players and actions are the same as in g, and, with high probability, each player knows that his payo¤s are given by g (though there need not be common or approximate common knowledge of payo¤s). A Nash equilibrium of g is said to be robust to incomplete information if every incomplete information game su¢ ciently close to g possesses a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium such that both equilibria induce similar distributions over actions.
KM motivated their concept of robustness by pointing out that an analyst who wishes to model some strategic environment as a complete information game (that describes the environment correctly with high probability) is unlikely to be aware of the …ne details of the true information structure, which the players know and take into account in their strategic decisions. "If it is guaranteed that the analyst's prediction based on the complete information game is not qualitatively di¤erent from some equilibrium of the real incomplete information game being played, then the analyst will be justi…ed in ignoring subtle informational complications."(KM, p. 1283)
We echo this motivation, and shall keep the above notion of "closeness"to g. We shall however relax the assumption that equilibrium behavior in close incomplete information games is exact, by allowing approximate Bayesian Nash equilibria. Given " 0; we say that a Nash equilibrium of g is "-robust to incomplete information if every incomplete information game su¢ ciently close to g possesses a Bayesian-Nash (interim) "-equilibrium such that both equilibria induce similar action distributions.
The concept of robustness of KM is obviously identical to our notion when we take " = 0; i.e., our 0-robustness is just the KM-robustness. For " > 0, the notion of "-robustness is less demanding. However, "-robustness may also imply implausible behavior in nearby incomplete information games, where players may consistently "-deviate from their best responses, no matter how close the incomplete information games are to g: This is what the following de…nition is set to rule out. We say that a Nash equilibrium is approximately robust to incomplete information if it is "-robust for any " > 0. 1 Our notion of approximate robustness constitutes a mild and natural extension of KM-robustness. Unlike KM, we do allow players to make small mistakes -slight deviations from their best responses -in incomplete information games that are close to g, in approximating the behavior in a 1 The notion of robustness based on approximate best responses has been proposed by Chen and Xiong (2011) in the context of selecting rationalizable actions in incomplete information games via perturbing higher order beliefs. However, their notion acts as a re…nement of the Weinsten and Yildiz (2007) selection procedure in which the best responses are exact, while in our case approximate robustness extends KM-robustness. Nash equilibrium of g. But, to keep the spirit of exactness set forth in KM, the de…nition of approximate robustness requires that these mistakes become vanishingly small as the incomplete information games "converge" to g. Thus, the analyst in the KM story will still do well by choosing an approximately robust equilibrium (henceforth, ARE) in the complete information game g, as this prediction is quite justi…able -in the real incomplete information game close to g players do not need to depart from rationality beyond some practically negligible bound, if at all, to arrive at the predicted action distribution.
Part of the conceptual appeal of approximate robustness lies in the fact that the set of ARE is well behaved. The main result of this paper, Theorem 2, shows that the correspondence which maps each complete information game to the (possibly empty) set of its ARE is upper hemicontinuous. Since the robustness embodies the continuity with respect to information, it goes without saying that the additional, implied, aspect of continuity, with respect to the base complete information game, provides an important support for the notion of approximate robustness. In contrast, the KM-robust equilibrium correspondence is not upper hemicontinuous, as we will show in Section 5.
The upper hemicontinuity of the ARE correspondence has an immediate application. It implies that, if the set of ARE is non-empty for a class of games, then the set is non-empty for the closure of that class. We use this fact to show that every two-player zero-sum game possesses an ARE (see Corollary 3), as does every two-player two-action game (see Corollary 4) . These claims do not hold in general for KM-robust equilibria (henceforth, KM-RE), however. We will show in Section 5 that a zero-sum game may not have a KM-RE unless there is a unique saddle point (which is then a KM-RE by Proposition 3.2 in KM).
Since there are games that possess an ARE but not a KM-RE, a fortiori approximate robustness is strictly weaker than KM-robustness, despite an a priori similarity of the two notions. This weakness stresses another useful aspect of approximate robustness -adopting it as an alternative to the KM notion has the e¤ect of strictly extending the domain of games in which a robust equilibrium exists. 2 Our paper is organized as follows. The basic notations pertaining to games of complete and incomplete information are presented in Section 2.
2 Such an extension is a much needed step, as there are games without a KM-RE, and there are only limited KM-RE existence results (see, e.g., KM, Ui (2001), Morris and Ui (2005) ). The general scope of this extension remains an open question, however, and some games of interest are obviously left out. For instance, Oyama and Takahashi (2011) describe an open set of two-player supermodular games without a KM-RE, but non-existence of ARE in these games can also be established in a similar way. Section 3 introduces our notions of "-robustness and approximate robustness. Section 4 contains our main result on upper hemicontinuity of the ARE correspondence (Theorem 2), supplemented by Corollaries 3 and 4 that establish existence of ARE in two subclasses of two-player games. Finally, Section 5 considers an example of a 4 4 zero-sum game, which shows simultaneously that the existence of an ARE does not guarantee the existence of a KM-RE, and that the KM-RE correspondence is not upper hemicontinuous.
Preliminaries

Complete Information Games
We follow the notation of KM as close as possible for ease of comparison. Throughout the analysis we …x a …nite set of players I = f1; 2; :::; Ig and a …nite set A i of actions for each player i 2 I. Denote by A := i2I A i the set of players'action pro…les. We shall denote j6 =i A j by A i and a generic element of A i by a i . Similar conventions will be used whenever they are clear from the context. A complete information game is given by an I-tuple g = (g i ) i2I ; where g i : A ! R is the payo¤ function of player i for each i 2 I.
For a given …nite set B; denote by (B) the simplex of probability vectors on B, i.e.,
An element of (A i ) is referred to as a mixed action for player i and that of (A) as an action distribution. The distance between two action distributions is measured by the sup norm: thus, for any ; 0 2 (A) we write
An action distribution, 2 (A), is a correlated equilibrium of a game g if, for all i 2 I and a i ; a
An action distribution is a Nash equilibrium of g if it is a correlated equilibrium, and is a product distribution induced by a mixed action pro…le, i.e., for all a 2 A,
where i 2 (A i ) is the marginal distribution of on A i . Whenever convenient, a Nash equilibrium will be represented by the mixed action pro…le ( 1 ; :::; I ) : Denote by N E (g) the set of Nash equilibria of g.
Incomplete Information Games
In line with KM, we now extend the de…nition of a game to allow uncertainty and incomplete information. The underlying uncertainty in an incomplete information game is described by a probability space ( ; P ) ; where is a countable 3 set of states of nature; and P is a countably additive probability measure on which is the common prior belief of the players about the actual state of nature: The information of player i is given by a (possibly in…nite) partition Q i of : The payo¤s to player i are determined by a state dependent payo¤ function,
The incomplete information game with the above attributes will be denoted by U = ; P; fQ i g i2I ; fu i g i2I . Given ! 2 ; denote by Q i (!) the unique element of Q i that contains !; if ! is the actual state of nature, player i only knows that the realized state belongs to Q i (!) : We will henceforth assume 4 that every information set of every player is possible, i.e., that P (Q i (!)) > 0 for all i 2 I and ! 2 . Under this assumption the conditional probability of state ! given information set Q i (!), written P (!jQ i (!)), is well-de…ned by the rule
. A (behavioral) strategy of player i is a Q i -measurable function i : ! (A i ); i (a i j!) will denote the probability that player i chooses action a i given !: A strategy pro…le is an I-tuple = ( i ) i2I where i is a strategy of player i. We denote by (aj!) the probability that action pro…le a = ( ; a i ;
) is chosen given ! under ; i.e., (aj!) = Q i2I i (a i j!). Write X i for the set of strategies for player i, and X for the set of all the strategy pro…les. Also denote by X i the set of strategy pro…les of players other than player i, and write i for ( j ) j6 =i .
Abusing notation, we extend the domain of each u i to mixed strategies and thus write u i ( (!) ; !) for P a2A u i (a; !) (aj!). When ! 2 occurs, the interim payo¤ of strategy pro…le to player i is given by the conditional expectation
Thus far our setup has been identical to that of KM. We now extend the scope of KM by considering approximate, and not just exact, equilibria in incomplete information games. For " 0 a strategy pro…le^ 2 X is an (interim) Bayesian "-Nash equilibrium of U (henceforth, "-BE for short) if, for every player i, for all i 2 X i and for all ! 2 ,
Denote by BE " (U) the set of all "-BE of U:
Notice that the slack " is chosen uniformly across the states of nature, and so the notion of "-BE is much stronger than what one might regard as an "ex ante" "-equilibrium. By the principle of dynamic optimization, a 0-BE is just the standard Bayesian Nash equilibrium of U (BE for short).
An action distribution,^ 2 (A), is an "-BE equilibrium action distribution of U if there exists a^ 2 BE " (U) which induces^ ; that is,
Approximate Robustness
Following KM, an incomplete information game U is deemed close to a complete information game g if the payo¤ structure under U is equal to g with high probability. Formally, for a given incomplete information game U we de…ne for every i 2 I:
and set (U; g) \ i i (U; g). An incomplete information game U is said to be a -elaboration of a complete information game g if P ( (U; g)) 1 .
5
The following de…nition extends the KM notion of informational robustness in that it does not require the BE in elaborations to be exact: 6 De…nition 1 Given a complete information game g and " 0; an action distribution is "-robust to incomplete information in g ("-RE for short), 5 Our -elaboration is a slight extention of the original notion of KM, who require that P ( (U; g)) = 1
. It is easy to see that both de…nitions of -elaboration would give rise to identical concepts of robustness (introduced in De…nition 1 below). However, our notion streamlines several mathematical arguments in the sequel, as any -elaboration is also a 0 -elaboration in our sense, for any 0 > . 6 One could de…ne a weaker concept by restricting elaborations to canonical elaborations, as in Kajii and Morris (1997b) and Ui (2001) . It will become clear that all the results and comments we report in this paper remain valid for the weaker notion. It is however an open question whether this is a strictly weaker notion.
if for any > 0, there exists > 0 with the following property: anyelaboration U of g with 0 possesses an "-BE action distribution such that with k k . An action distribution is approximately robust to incomplete information if it is "-robust for any " > 0.
Notice that if
is "-robust to incomplete information, it must be an "-Nash equilibrium 7 of g (as follows from De…nition 1 by considering the degenerate 0-elaboration of g with j j = 1). Thus an approximately robust action distribution is necessarily a Nash equilibrium of g, and we will refer to it as an approximately robust equilibrium (ARE for short) from now on. The set of ARE in the game g is denoted by ARE (g) :
As was said, our notions of "-and approximate robustness extend the de…nition of robustness introduced in KM, that considers only exact (0-)BE equilibria in elaborations. Thus the Nash equilibria which are KM-robust are precisely the 0-robust action distributions. It follows from the de…nition that any KM-robust action distribution is approximately robust, and thus the set of KM-robust equilibria (KM-RE for short) is a subset of ARE (g).
Given the conceptual closeness of requirements that the notions of KMrobustness and approximate robustness impose on equilibria, one might conjecture that the sets of KM-RE and ARE coincide. It turns out, however, that approximate robustness is a strictly weaker notion. It will be shown in Section 5, where we construct a game g in which there is no KM-RE, but ARE (g) 6 = .
Results
Upper Hemicontinuity of the ARE Correspondence
We shall show that the approximate robustness exhibits a desirable continuity property: the correspondence which maps each complete information game into the set of approximate robust equilibria is upper hemicontinuous. Interestingly enough, the analogous correspondence which maps a game into the set of its KM-robust equilibria is not upper hemicontinuous, as we elaborate in Section 5.
Formally, endow the set of all complete information games with the metric d ; given by
For " 0; a product distribution 2 (A) is an "-Nash equilibrium of g if for each i 2 I, i is an "-best response of i to i :
for every g; g 0 2 : Note that the Nash equilibrium correspondence, g 7 ! N E (g) is upper hemicontinuous with this metric. The next result shows that its sub-correspondence, the ARE correspondence g 7 ! ARE (g)
For any 0 and any -elaboration U = ; P; fQ i g i2I ; fu i g i2I of g; denote by U = ; P; fQ i g i2I ; f u i g i2I the incomplete information game where, for every a 2 A, ! 2 and i 2 I,
otherwise.
That is, U is obtained by replacing g i with g i whenever player i knows (in U) that his payo¤ is given by g i . Clearly, U is a -elaboration of the game g, and we shall call it a -elaboration of g induced by U for later reference. Note that the second inequality in (6) implies via (7) and (3) that for any strategy pro…le ,
for every i 2 I; at every ! 2 ; where U i and U i are the interim payo¤s of i in U and U, respectively, de…ned as in (3). Combining (8) with (4) in the de…nition of "-BE, it is readily con…rmed that every
-BE strategy pro…le^ of U is also an "-BE of U; that is,
Recall that is approximately robust in g by assumption, and in particular it is " 2 -robust in g. So there exists 0 < such that for any 0 ; any induced -elaboration U of g possesses some b U 2 BE " 2 U which induces an action distribution b U such that
Now, for any -elaboration U of g with 0 , consider the induced elaboration U, and^ U 2 BE " 2 U ; b U 2 (A) as above. By (9) we have b U 2 BE " (U) ; and by the …rst inequality in (6), and (10), also
Since as above can be found for any > 0; we conclude that is "-robust in the game g. And, since " > 0 was chosen arbitrarily, is in fact approximately robust, as we claimed.
Existence of ARE in Subclasses of Two-Player Games
An immediate consequence of the upper hemicontinuity property established in Theorem 2 is that if the set of ARE is non-empty for a class of games, then the set is non-empty for the closure of the class. Here we apply this observation to show the existence of ARE in all two-player zero-sum games, and all two-player two-action games.
Corollary 3
If g is a two-player zero-sum game, i.e., I = 2 and g 2 = g 1 ; then ARE (g) 6 = :
Proof. By Bohnenblust et al (1950), a complete information two-player zerosum game has a unique pair of optimal mixed actions (and thus a unique Nash equilibrium) for a generic 8 payo¤ matrix of player 1. By Proposition 3.2 in KM and the discussion following it, this unique Nash equilibrium is a KM-RE:
Thus, given a zero-sum game g, there exists a sequence g
of zerosum games such that lim k!1 g k = g, and, for each k 1; the game g k has a KM-RE (which is in particular an ARE). A limit point of these ARE must belong to ARE (g) by Theorem 2, and thus we have ARE (g) 6 = .
Corollary 4 If g is a two-player two-action game, i.e., I = jA 1 j = jA 2 j = 2, then ARE (g) 6 = :
Proof. The su¢ cient conditions of Propositions 3.2 and 5.3, and Corollary 5.6 in KM imply the existence of KM-RE in a generic 2 2 game (KM, p. 1301). As in the proof of Corollary 3, the application of Theorem 2 shows that ARE (g) 6 = in any 2 2 game g. 
Approximate Robustness is weaker than KMrobustness
We now present an example of a two-player zero-sum game g that does not possess a KM-RE. Since ARE exist in all two-player zero-sum games by Corollary 3, this example demonstrates that the notion of approximate robustness is strictly weaker than the notion of KM-robustness. Moreover, as at least some Nash equilibria in g are limit points of KM-RE in nearby games (by the proof of Corollary 3), the non-existence of KM-RE also implies that the KM-RE correspondence is not upper hemicontinuous. This stands in contrast to the upper hemicontinuity of the ARE correspondence g 7 ! ARE (g) that was established in Theorem 2. Consider a zero-sum two-player game g; in which both players have four actions; and the payo¤s of player 1 are given by the following matrix (where an action of player 1 (resp., 2) is represented by a choice of row (resp., column)): 
Note that, if players'choices are con…ned to either the …rst two rows/columns, or the last two rows/columns, then they play the matching pennies game. Any strategy which selects the …rst two rows/columns with equal probability, and the last two rows/columns with equal probability is a mixed equilibrium strategy. We shall verify below that this game has no KM-RE. We do so by constructing two elaboration sequences, both of which approach the game g, such that each elaboration has a unique BE (we will establish this by employing the standard contagion argument). 9 But it will then become clear that the (uniquely determined) action distributions induced by the BE converge to di¤erent limits in the two sequences, which implies that no action distribution can be a KM-RE.
For the …rst sequence, …x 0 < < 1: In what follows we describe a 2 -elaboration U = ; P; fQ i g i2I ; fu i g i2I of game g. Let
9 By construction, our elaborations of g will also be canonical in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997b) and Ui (2001) , as every player i will have a strictly dominant pure action outside the set i (U; g) : and assume that each player i can discern only the i th coordinate in each state (t 1 ; t 2 ) 2 ; i.e., that Q 1 ((t 1 ; t 2 )) = ft 1 g fmax(t 1 1; 0); t 1 g and Q 2 ((t 1 ; t 2 )) = ft 2 ; t 2 + 1g ft 2 g :
for all k 0: The following table illustrates the information structure and the prior.
(1 ) 
10 Note that with our speci…cation of payo¤s, the incomplete information game U is zero-sum in every state of nature. Thus, our method will show that the game g has no KM-robust equilibrium even under the restriction that all nearby incomplete information elaborations must be of zero-sum nature. However, the same proof would work if we assumed that, for both i = 1; 2, player i's payo¤s are given by his payo¤s ing when t i = 0, and by his payo¤s in g when t i > 0: Thus, the elaborations we use can be given another special feature (in addition to being canonical in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997b) and Ui (2001) , as every player i is "committed" to his strictly dominant action given t i = 0) -it can be assumed that each player i is "commited" to some strategy precisely when he know that his payo¤s are not given by g, i.e., when i (U ; g) does not occur.
Claim 5 For every 0 < < 1; elaboration U has a unique BE (b 1 ; b 2 ) ; where
Proof. Consider a BE (b 1 ; b 2 ) of U . Note that pure action r 2 is strictly dominant for player 1 conditional on t 1 = 0; and also that c 1 is strictly dominant for player 2 conditional on t 2 = 0 (since the conditional probability that player 2 assigns at t 2 = 0 to the event thatg in (13) is played, equals
and
The relations (16) and (17) thus establish (14) for k = 0: Next, conditional on t 1 = 1; player 1 knows that the game is given by g. He believes that t 2 = 0 with probability : Taking into account that c 1 is played by player 2 at t 2 = 0 (as shown in (16)), the conditional expected payo¤ of player 1 at t 1 = 1 is given by the following matrix, where the rows correspond to the possible actions of 1 given t 1 = 1; and the columns correspond to the possible actions of 2 given t 2 = 1 : 
So no matter what player 2 plays at t 2 = 1, action r 1 is strictly dominant for player 1 given t 1 = 1; and hence it must be played in any BE. We have thus shown that
Similarly at t 2 = 1, using the fact that player 1's BE action at t 1 = 1 is r 1 as shown in (19), and that player 2 attributes to t 1 = 1 probability
, it can be shown that
action for player 1 in the game with payo¤ matrix (18). But the dominant action r 1 beats r 2 only by a tiny margin, which becomes vanishingly small as ! 0. Thus in an "-BE, where players can make small but non-negligible (compared to ) mistakes in their best responses, the choice of r 1 by player 1 is by no means necessary when t 1 = 1: This is what allows players in an "-BE to shift the weight from the actions prescribed by the unique (exact) BE (b 1 ; b 2 ) to other actions, thereby generating action distributions corresponding to ( 1 ; 2 ) or ( 1 ; 2 ) in the limit as ! 0. But our argument that establishes the approximate robustness of ( 1 ; 2 ) ; ( 1 ; 2 ), and ( 1 ; 2 ) works indirectly, without the need to explicitly construct an "-BE in every elaboration close to g; having the property that the corresponding action distributions approximate the chosen equilibrium.
Remark 7 Similar but simpler arguments can be used to show that KM-RE may not exist in a two-player two-action game, unlike the ARE (whose existence in such games is guaranteed by Corollary 4). Indeed, consider a two-player coordination game h, whose payo¤s given by the following matrix: 
:
Amend the construction of elaboration U = ; P; fQ i g i2I ; fu i g i2I above, by replacing the game g with h, and the gameg with e h whose payo¤s are described by: The unique BE of U consists of playing the …rst pure action in every state of nature, by both players. In a similarly amended elaboration U 0 = ; P; fQ i g i2I ; fu 0 i g i2I ; the unique BE prescribes playing the second pure action in every state of nature, by both players. As the corresponding BE action distributions are supported on distinct action pro…les, (r 1 ; c 1 ) and (r 2 ; c 2 ) ; it is clear that the game h has no KM-RE.
Concluding Remarks
The notion of KM-robustness stipulates that a robust NE of the game g must be imitable by a certain BE action distribution in any incomplete information elaboration of g; provided that elaboration is su¢ ciently "close" to g. The notion of closeness that underlies KM-robustness is rather loose, as it does not take into account information details that are not directly related to each player's knowledge of his own payo¤s, and hence KM-robustness is a very strong property 11 . If one strengthen the notion of closeness, however, a weaker concept of robustness is obtained, and Kajii and Morris (1997b) take this route. Obviously, analogous exercises can be carried out for the approximate robustness. We discuss one particular case of importance below.
Recall that in an incomplete information elaboration of g, there is a high probability that each player knows that his payo¤s are given by g but it is not required that, with high probability, it is common knowledge that g is being played. Since the game being common knowledge is often deemed as a prerequisite for an NE being played, in the context of a robustness excercise it is of interest to check the implication of an additional requirement that, for players in an elaboration, it is "close to common knowledge" that g is being played. Kajii and Morris (1997b) consider the following mode of convergence of elaborations to g; which they call limit common knowledge (LCK): the probability of the event where it is common p-belief that g is played, must approach 1, for every p < 1:
12 They show that any semi-strict NE (which is just a slight generalization of a strict NE) is KM-robust w.r.t. LCK elaborations. But not all NE are KM-robust w.r.t. LCK elaborations.
In our context, call an NE "-robust w.r.t. LCK elaborations if for any sequence of elaborations LCK-converging to g, there is a sequence of "-BE action distributions in these elaborations which converges to the NE. An NE is then LCK-approximately robust (LCK-ARE) if it is "-robust w.r.t. LCK elaborations for any " > 0.
It can then be shown that any NE is an LCK-ARE, by applying Theorem B of Monderer and Samet (1989, p. 184) . The argument works roughly as follows. Choose an NE, and …x any sequence of elaborations LCK-converging to g. To establish "-robustness of that NE, construct a strategy pro…le in each elaboration using the following steps: (i) …x a high p < 1; (ii) on those information sets of a player where it is common p-belief that g is played, assign him the (mixed) action prescribed by the given NE; (iii) consider the game in which players only take action on information sets not included in step (ii) -and play actions …xed in step (ii) elsewhere -and take some equilibrium of this game. This fully speci…es all players' strategies in each elaboration. Note that, by construction, players best-respond on information sets where their actions have been determined in step (iii), and on information sets where their actions have been set as the given NE actions in step (ii), players "-best respond if the elaboration is close enough to g, since they know that the opponents play the NE actions with high probability.
Viewed in a wider context, this result shows that LCK-approximate robustness completely characterizes the NE of any complete information game g, conforming with the analysis of Monderer and Samet (1989) ; to put it differently, we can accommodate the analysis of Monderer and Samet (1989) in the study of informational robustness of equilibria. Although no new mathematical technique is involved in this observation, it is worthy of note, since it casts approximate robustness in another role, as one of the conceptual uderpinnings of Nash equilibrium.
We conclude with an open question. As has been pointed out in the proofs of Corollaries 3 and 4, both KM-RE and ARE exist in generic two-player zero-sum, and two-player two-action, games, and it can also be shown that these equilibria are generically unique 13 . Thus, in generic games of these two categories, the notions of KM-robustness and approximate robustness are equivalent, though we know (KM, Oyama and Takahashi (2011), Section 5 of this paper) that the equivalence does not hold in general. It is not known to us, at present, whether the notions di¤er on an open set of complete information games, or coincide (or, at least, are equivalent in terms of existence) for a generic choice of game. 13 For instance, a generic two-player zero-sum game has a unique correlated equilibrium by the proof of Corollary 3, and as such it is the unique ARE (since all limit points of "-BE action distributions in incomplete information elaborations converging to g must be "-correlated equilibria, and any limit point of the latter, when " ! 0; is an (exact) correlated equilibrium).
